James Van Cleve examines the main topics from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, such as transcendental idealism, necessity and analyticity, space and time, substance and cause, noumena and things-in-themselves, problems of the self, and rational theology. He also discusses the relationship between Kant's thought and that of modern anti-realists, such as Putnam and Dummett. Because Van Cleve focuses upon specific problems rather than upon entire passages or sections of the Critique, he makes Kant's work more accessible to the serious (...) student and scholar. (shrink)

This article offers a critique of the contemporary Contemplative Tradition’s view of spiritual transformation from the lens of the universally accepted letters of Paul. The article argues that contemporary contemplatives, especially Dallas Willard and Richard Foster, differ from Paul in three principle areas. Firstly, whereas Paul’s concept of transformation is based largely on objective realities, representatives of the Contemplative Tradition tend to focus on subjective realities. Secondly, contemporary contemplatives view transformation as coming as one imitates the life of Christ, his (...) daily disciplines and activities, whereas Paul’s view centres on the death of Christ as foundational to the Christian’s identity and thus vital to the way they live out their faith. Finally, the cornerstone of the contemporary Contemplative Tradition’s view of spiritual transformation is the belief that the essential means by which transformation takes place is engagement in the spiritual disciplines. It is argued that many of the activities that are denominated as ‘spiritual disciplines’ are not in fact ‘transformative’ activities, and thus do not fit the category of spiritual disciplines. Furthermore, this study insists that Paul seldom links the practice of the disciplines with the means of transformation, offering instead five examples of specific means of transformation that flow out of Paul’s accepted letters. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth.

This chapter contains section titled: The Relativity of the Present The Relativity of Existence Conclusion.

One way to determine the quality and pace of change in a science as it undergoes a major transition is to follow some feature of it which remains relatively stable throughout the process. Following the chosen item as it goes through reinterpretation permits conclusions to be drawn about the nature and scope of the broader change in question. In what follows, this device is applied to the change which took place in logic in the mid-nineteenth century. The feature chosen as (...) the focal point is the categorical syllogism. (shrink)

This book is a systematic study of the uses of tropes in metaphysics. By a trope Bacon says he understands either a thing’s having a property or the property as localized to that thing. Bacon believes that entities belonging to the following ontological categories, among others, may all be constructed out of tropes: individuals, universals, states of affairs, and possible worlds. Evidently, if you have tropes, the other categories are all de trop. Bacon also uses trope theory to provide analyses (...) of time, causation, belief, and duty. (shrink)

PROFILES AN INTERNATIONAL SERIES ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHERS AND LOGICIANS EDITORS RADU ... University of Warsaw J. VUILLEMIN, College de France VOLUME 5 ...

Much of everyday language is vague, even in situations where vagueness could have been avoided. Yet the benefits of vagueness for hearers and readers are proving to be elusive. We discuss a range of earlier controlled experiments with human participants, and we report on a new series of experiments that we ourselves have conducted in recent years. These experiments, which focus on vague expressions that are part of referential noun phrases, aim to separate the utility of vagueness from the utility (...) of other factors that tend to co-occur with vagueness. After presenting the evidence, we argue that it supports a view where the benefits that vague terms exert are due to other influences, and not to vagueness itself. (shrink)

In this time of increasingly critical scrutiny of the very point of the social sciences, those negatively inclined on the issue will find an unwitting ally in Brian Fay—unless, that is, one thinks that social science is best regarded as part of a postmodern wonderland in which science, now relativized to social and political setting, is regarded as being just one means among many of gaining knowledge. If that is how science should be regarded, Fay is on the cutting edge.

My agenda in this book is set mainly by Kant himself. I take up most of the main topics in the Critique of Pure Reason, more or less in the order in which Kant considered them. This summary gives only conclusions, not arguments, for which I refer the reader to the book itself.

On the first point, the issue dividing us is this: when Kant seeks to unfold the necessary conditions of experience, what sense of ‘experience’ does he have in mind? I think it is sometimes a thin sense in which nothing more is posited than the bare consciousness of representations. Ameriks thinks it is a thicker sense in which experience involves judgment, perhaps even true judgment, and perhaps even knowledge.

The present study examined the costs and benefits of native language similarity for non-native vocabulary learning. Because learning a second language is difficult, many learners start with easy words that look like their native language to jumpstart their vocabulary. However, this approach may not be the most effective strategy in the long-term, compared to introducing difficult L2 vocabulary early on. We examined how L1 orthographic typicality affects pattern learning of novel vocabulary by teaching English monolinguals either Englishlike or Non-Englishlike pseudowords (...) that contained repeated orthographic patterns. We found that overall, the first words that individuals learned during initial acquisition influenced which words they acquired later. Specifically, learning a new word in one session made it easier to acquire an orthographically similar word in the next session. Similarity among non-native words interacted with native language similarity, so that words that looked more like English were easier to learn at first, but they were less effective at influencing later word learning. This demonstrates that although native language similarity has a beneficial effect early on, it may reduce learners' ability to benefit from non-native word patterns during continued acquisition. This surprising finding demonstrates that making learning easier may not be the most effective long-term strategy. Learning difficult vocabulary teaches the learner what makes non-native words unique, and this general wordform knowledge may be more valuable than the words themselves. We conclude that native language similarity modulates new vocabulary acquisition and that difficulties during learning are not always to be avoided, as additional effort early on can pay later dividends. (shrink)

My agenda in this book is set mainly by Kant himself. I take up most of the main topics in the Critique of Pure Reason, more or less in the order in which Kant considered them. This summary gives only conclusions, not arguments, for which I refer the reader to the book itself.

On the first point, the issue dividing us is this: when Kant seeks to unfold the necessary conditions of experience, what sense of ‘experience’ does he have in mind? I think it is sometimes a thin sense in which nothing more is posited than the bare consciousness of representations. Ameriks thinks it is a thicker sense in which experience involves judgment, perhaps even true judgment, and perhaps even knowledge.

This is a marvelous book. Langton offers a fresh interpretation of Kant, the main tenets of which she states in a few bold propositions and then goes on to elaborate with great clarity and care. She supports her interpretation with a wealth of citations accompanied by insightful commentary. The “Humility” of her title is the thesis that we can have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of things, which is Langton’s gloss on the Kantian slogan that we can have no (...) knowledge of things as they are in themselves. The central argument she finds in Kant for this thesis proceeds from premises to which I believe many contemporary philosophers would give their assent. It is therefore an argument to which we should give careful consideration. (shrink)

The core of Livingston’s book consists of a series of four critical studies of how twentieth-century analytic philosophy dealt with what many believe to be a hard case: consciousness. What makes it hard, the thinking goes, is a perceived dissonance that arises when analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on representing the world against a background of linguistic structure, comes face to face with pure subjective content. How can the latter be accommodated within the former without ignoring some of its fundamental (...) properties? The root problem is endlessly old and much larger than the scope of Livingston’s immediate concern. While we have pure experiences — being whacked by a golf ball or swept up by a tornado — the instant we reflect on our situation, immediacy is lost and knowledge becomes unavoidably perspectival, restricted, partial — a world structured by predication. Can the former be accommodated within the latter without doing injustice to the very qualities that distinguish it? Each philosophical generation has dealt with some version of the problem, from Plato’s insistence that real knowledge demands that the mind kick the traces of earthly existence, to more recent attempts to isolate a “given” element in experience, and thereby relate phenomenal immediacy to structured propositional knowledge. (shrink)

The aim of this review is to show the fruitfulness of using images of facial expressions as experimental stimuli in order to study how neural systems support biologically relevant learning as it relates to social interactions. Here we consider facial expressions as naturally conditioned stimuli which, when presented in experimental paradigms, evoke activation in amygdala–prefrontal neural circuits that serve to decipher the predictive meaning of the expressions. Facial expressions offer a relatively innocuous strategy with which to investigate these normal variations (...) in affective information processing, as well as the promise of elucidating what role the aberrance of such processing might play in emotional disorders. (shrink)

Freedom of information laws promote transparency by permitting individuals and organizations to obtain government documents. However, exemptions from disclosure are necessary to protect privacy and to permit government officials to deliberate freely. Deliberative language is often the most challenging and burdensome exemption to detect, leading to high processing costs and delays in responding to open-records requests. This paper describes a novel deliberative-language detection model trained on a new annotated training set. The deliberative-language detection model is a component of a decision-support (...) system for open-records requests under the US Freedom of Information Act, the FOIA Assistant, that ingests documents responsive to an open-records requests, suggests passages likely to be subject to deliberative language, privacy, or other exemptions, and assists analysts in rapidly redacting suggested passages. The tool’s interface is based on extensive human-factors and usability studies with analysts and is currently in operational testing by multiple US federal agencies. (shrink)

Psillos has recently argued that van Fraassen’s arguments against abduction fail. Moreover, he claimed that, if successful, these arguments would equally undermine van Fraassen’s own constructive empiricism, for, Psillos thinks, it is only by appeal to abduction that constructive empiricism can be saved from issuing in a bald scepticism. We show that Psillos’ criticisms are misguided, and that they are mostly based on misinterpretations of van Fraassen’s arguments. Furthermore, we argue that Psillos’ arguments for his claim that constructive empiricism itself (...) needs abduction point up to his failure to recognize the importance of van Fraassen’s broader epistemology for constructive empiricism. Towards the end of our paper we discuss the suspected relationship between constructive empiricism and scepticism in the light of this broader epistemology, and from a somewhat more general perspective. (shrink)